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The Ethical Dilemma of a Special 







 A basic tenet of legal ethics requires lawyers to advocate 
their clients‘ interests.1 Ordinarily, the client determines the 
nature and scope of the representation, and the lawyer merely 
uses special skills and training to achieve the goals defined by 
the client. Yet, this principle presents a significant dilemma for 
the special education lawyer: who is the client? On the one 
hand, there is the child, who not only needs assistance and 
protection, but also stands at the center of the dispute. On the 
other hand, there is the parent who possesses the fundamental 
right to decide their child‘s education. 
Much of this dilemma can be attributed to the mounting 
concern for the rights of the developmentally disabled and the 
legal rights of children. Recent movements in the legal 
community reveal a desperate need for child advocacy and 
recognize that children, not attorneys, should direct the 
objectives and scope of legal representation.2 The American Bar 
Association agrees. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Model Rules) instruct a lawyer to maintain a normal lawyer-
 
 * B.A., Fordham University (2005); Masters in Urban Education, Mercy 
College (2008); J.D. Candidate, Pace University School of Law (2011). The 
Author would like to express her gratitude to her family for their unyielding 
support during law school and throughout her life; and to Professor Don 
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1. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 2 (2009). 
2. Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal 
Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996) [hereinafter 
Fordham Conference]; see also Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on 
Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years 
After Fordham, 6 NEV. L.J. 592 (2006). 
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client relationship with a client with diminished capacity, 
―whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some 
other reason.‖3 Lawyers, however, continue to grapple with a 
number of questions that the Model Rules provide minimal 
guidance for: is the child the client; what is the role of the 
parent and the lawyer; and what is the appropriate course of 
representation? 
Special education representation further complicates these 
issues. Since it is the parent who seeks legal representation, 
most, if not all, parents assume the role of the client. As the 
client, the parent wants to define the goals of the 
representation and views the lawyer‘s role as achieving those 
goals. While the child has immediate and lasting interest in the 
representation, she is barely involved in the representation. 
While the child‘s role in the representation is strengthened if 
she is the client, these issues are far from resolved. The 
representation must also respect and incorporate the parent‘s 
fundamental right to decide the child‘s education. 
With a rise in the number of families seeking special 
education representation, these issues require prompt 
attention and, while client identification is ambiguous and 
problematic, it can be resolved by conscious choice. This 
Comment proposes recognizing the child, not the parent, as the 
client. Under this premise, a lawyer lacks the independent 
authority to decide what is best for the child. The parent, as 
the ―natural guardian,‖4 has the authority to decide the child‘s 
best interests. As the client, however, the child actively 
participates in the representation and the lawyer‘s ultimate 
ethical responsibility extends toward the child, not the parent. 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of Model Rule 
1.14 and its commentary. Part II analyzes parental rights 
under American jurisprudence and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).5 Part III discusses the need 
for child advocacy and the role of the child‘s lawyer in other 
proceedings involving children. Lastly, Part IV proposes that 
 
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2009). 
4. Id. R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (2009). 
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2004). 
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the child is the client and discusses the roles of the parent and 
the lawyer in such a relationship. 
 
II. The Major Source of Confusion: Model Rule 1.14 
 
The Model Rules do not address a lawyer‘s dilemma in 
deciding whether to represent the parent or the child. Rather, 
Model Rule 1.14 instructs a lawyer to maintain a normal 
lawyer-client relationship with a client with diminished 
capacity when reasonably possible. While it explicitly refers to 
children as clients with diminished capacity,6 it provides 
minimal guidance in determining the course of representation 
and the role of the parent. As a result, the lawyer is left to 
interpret, understand, and apply Model Rule 1.14. 
Model Rule 1.14(a) provides that, ―when a client‘s capacity 
to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a 
representation is diminished, whether because of minority, 
mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, 
as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal lawyer-client 
relationship with the client.‖7 The Rule‘s commentary provides 
that ―[a] normal lawyer-client relationship is based on the 
assumption that the client, when properly advised and 
assisted, is capable of making decisions about important 
matters.‖8 In such cases, ―a lawyer shall abide by a client‘s 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . 
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are 
to be pursued.‖9 Thus, when a child is capable of making 
decisions about important matters, a lawyer must abide by the 
child‘s decision. The Model Rules recognize, however, that a 
normal lawyer-client relationship with a child is not always 
possible.10 Accordingly, the extent of the lawyer-client 
relationship with the child depends on whether such a 
 
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2009). 
7. Id. (emphasis added). 
8. Id. R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2009). 
9. Id. R. 1.2(a) (2009). 
10. ―When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental 
capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may 
not be possible in all respects.‖ Id. R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2009). 
3
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relationship is ―reasonably possible.‖11 
In determining whether a lawyer-client relationship with a 
child is ―reasonably possible, the Rule and its commentary 
offers confusing and rather inconsistent guidance.‖12 On the 
one hand, the Model Rules presume that ―a child has the 
ability to direct his or her own representation.‖13 A Comment to 
Model Rule 1.14 offers that ―children as young as five or six 
years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded 
as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal 
proceedings concerning their custody.‖14 On the other hand, 
Comment 4 to the Rule permits parents to make decisions on 
behalf of their child. It states that ―[i]n matters involving a 
minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as 
natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or 
matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor.‖15 While 
the commentary recognizes that a normal lawyer-client 
relationship with a child is reasonably possible, it also 
encourages, but does not require, a lawyer to look to the parent 
in certain types of proceedings. When a lawyer should look to 
the parent and how much involvement the parent should have 
in the representation, however, is unclear and undefined. 
Therefore, Model Rule 1.14 does not resolve the dilemma 
faced by a special education lawyer. While the Rule does not 
waver in its designation of the child as the client, parents may 
also have a role in the proceeding. Therefore, a much more 
 
11. Id. R. 1.14(a) (2009). 
12. Id. R. 1.14(a) (2009). This phrase is bound to cause interpretative 
conflict. Although the ABA Rules offer definitions for ―reasonable or 
reasonably,‖ ―reasonable belief or reasonably believes,‖ and ―reasonably 
should know,‖ these definitions are to be used ―in reference to a lawyer.‖ Id. 
R. 1.0(h)-(j) (2009). There is no mention of what is reasonably possible in 
reference to the client or how a lawyer should determine what is reasonably 
possible. It appears that the American Bar Association left the phrase 
―reasonably possible‖ for the states to interpret. 
13. Elizabeth Laffitte, Model Rule 1.14: The Well-Intended Rule Still 
Leaves Some Questions Unanswered, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 330 (2004) 
(citing Michael D. Drews & Pamela Halprin, Note, Determining the Effective 
Representation of Child in Our Legal System, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 383, 386 (2002) 
(footnote omitted)). 
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2009). 
15. Id. R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (2009). 
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complex discussion of the laws governing parental rights and 
special education is necessary.16 
 
III. Parental Rights 
 
Although Model Rule 1.14 is explicit in requiring a lawyer 
to maintain a normal lawyer-client relationship with a minor, 
its commentary encourages a lawyer to look to parents, as the 
natural guardians, in certain types of proceedings.17 In special 
education proceedings, a parent‘s role in the representation 
must be decided and defined by their fundamental rights as 
parents and the laws governing special education. ―Our 
jurisprudence historically reflect[s] . . . broad parental 
authority over minor children.‖18 Parents, as natural 
guardians, have the authority to make decisions concerning the 
medical, moral, intellectual, and financial welfare of their 
children.19 Parents also have the power to decide their child‘s 
education and participate in the special education process. 
In 1925, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a child 
is ―the mere creature of the State.‖ Rather, the Court asserted 
that parents ―have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare their children for additional 
 
16. The Preamble to the Model Rules recognizes that ―[m]any of a 
lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law.‖ Id. 
Preamble ¶ 7 (2009). 
17. Id. R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (2009). 
18. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. 
19. The law places children in a position of dependency. Parents or 
guardians are thought to ―possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, 
and capacity for the judgment required for making life‘s difficult decisions.‖ 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (leaving the decision to commit a 
child to a state mental institution largely up to the parent); see also Santosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (requiring ‗clear and convincing 
evidence‘ in proceedings to terminate parental rights); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exempting Amish children from compulsory formal 
education beyond eighth grade); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944) (―the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first with the 
parents‖); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (fundamental 
liberty excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only). 
5
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obligations.‖20 By 1972, ―the primary role of the parents in the 
upbringing of their children [was] established beyond debate as 
an enduring American tradition.‖21 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the 
Supreme Court recognized that ―history and culture of Western 
civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the 
nurture and upbringing of their children.‖22 It held that the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent states from 
compelling Amish parents to send their children to high school 
until they reach the age of sixteen.23 Parental rights, 
specifically with respect to a child‘s education, thus became 
recognized as a deep-rooted societal interest. 
Even when a child‘s freedom and liberty interest were at 
stake, parents retained the right to decide the upbringing and 
education of their children.24 In Parham v. J.R., minor children 
alleged that they had been deprived of their liberty without 
procedural due process by Georgia‘s mental health laws, which 
permitted parents or guardians to sign their minor children 
into mental hospitals.25 ―In defining the respective rights and 
prerogatives of the child and parent in the voluntary 
commitment setting,‖ the Court concluded that the ―precedents 
permit the parents to retain a substantial, if not the dominant, 
role in the decision . . . .‖26 It reasoned that the child‘s interest 
in not being committed is inextricably linked with the parents‘ 
interest in and obligation to the welfare and health of the 
child.27 ―[T]he parental role, [therefore], implies a substantial 
measure of authority over one‘s children.‖28 This authority 
rests on an acknowledgment of parental rights and on the 
belief that parents can best determine the interests of their 
 
20. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. at 232; see also Prince, 321 U.S. at 166; Pierce, 
268 U.S. at 535. 
21. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. at 232. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 234-35.   
24. Id. 
25. Parham, 442 U.S. at 590-91. 
26. Id. at 604 (emphasis added). 
27. Id. at 600. 
28. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (citation omitted) 
(invalidating a Massachusetts law requiring parental consent for abortions 
by unmarried minors). 
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children and are most likely to protect them.29 Accordingly, a 
parent‘s right to decide and participate in the child‘s education 
is a key focus of special education law. 
Congress reiterated the parent‘s right to decide how to 
educate their children through IDEA and its predecessor 
statute, the Education of All Handicapped Children Act. In 
1975, the IDEA replaced the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act in response to concerns from parents and 
educators over the exclusion of children with disabilities from 
school and the lack of support services for those children.30 To 
protect children with disabilities, the IDEA aims to strengthen 
the parent‘s role in special education.31 Several sections of the 
Act give parents decision-making authority and the right to 
otherwise guide their children‘s education.32 
A parent‘s right to make educational decisions on behalf of 
his or her child is seen in the legislative intent behind the 
formation and revision of the IDEA. In the statute‘s original 
form, ―Congress sought to protect individual children by 
providing for parental involvement in the development of state 
plans and policies and formulation of the child‘s individual 
educational program.‖33 As the Senate Report states: 
 
The Committee recognizes that in many 
instances the process of providing special 
education and related services to handicapped 
children is not guaranteed to produce any 
particular outcome. By changing the language [of 
the provision relating to individual educational 
programs] to emphasize the process of parent 
and child involvement and to provide a written 
record of reasonable expectations, the Committee 
intends to clarify that such individualized 
 
29. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03. 
30. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2004). 
31. Id. § 1400(c)(5)(B). 
32. See generally id. § 1400. 
33. Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176, 208 (1982) (examining the legislative history behind the Education 
of All Handicapped Children Act and IDEA). 
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planning conferences are a way to provide parent 
involvement and protection to assure that 
appropriate services are provided for 
handicapped children.34 
 
Under the IDEA Amendments of 2004, Congress sought to 
elevate the role of the parents from protector to decision-
maker, stating: 
 
Almost thirty years of research and experience 
has demonstrated that the education of children 
with disabilities can be made more effective by . . 
. strengthening the role and responsibility of 
parents and ensuring that families of such 
children have meaningful opportunities to 
participate in the education of their children at 
school and at home.35 
 
Based on this finding, the 2004 amendments to the IDEA 
allowed for increased parental involvement and decision-
making authority at every stage of the special education 
process. 
The parent‘s active role in the process heavily impacts the 
course of the representation, but it would be difficult to assess 
without first understanding the main stages of the process. The 
process begins with a referral for an evaluation from a parent, 
teacher, counselor, or some other school personnel.36 Before the 
school district can evaluate the student, written parental 
consent for the evaluation must be obtained.37 Once the student 
is evaluated, a team of qualified professionals, including the 
parent, reviews the results of the evaluation, and determines if 
 
34. Id. at 208-09 (citing Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975, S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 11-12 (1975), reprinted in, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1425, 1435); see also S. Rep. No. 94-445, at 30 (1975); 34 C.F.R § 300.345 
(1981). 
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(B) (2004). 
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(B) (2004). 
37. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) & (ii)(I); 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a) (2008). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/11
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the child is eligible for special education services.38 If it is 
determined that the child is eligible for services, a team, which 
includes the parent, meets to discuss and develop the child‘s 
individualized education program (IEP).39 The team determines 
what services are in the IEP, the location of those services, as 
well as any modifications to the program.40 The IEP lists any 
special services the child needs to access the general education 
environment, including goals that the child is expected to 
achieve in one year.41 At a minimum, the IEP is updated 
annually and the student is reevaluated at least once every 
three years.42 If, at any time, the parents disagree with the 
IEP, the proposed placement, or any changes made to the IEP, 
they may exercise their due process rights under the IDEA by 
filing a formal complaint or requesting mediation.43 If the 
parents and the school district are unable to reach a resolution, 
the parents may request an impartial hearing;44 if the parents 
disagree with the decision of the impartial hearing officer, the 
parents have a right to appeal to the state and bring a civil 
action.45 
One of the main purposes of the IDEA is ―to ensure that 
the rights of children with disabilities and the rights of their 
parents are protected.‖46 In fact, the IDEA does far more than 
protect a parent‘s role in special education; it requires a 
 
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.306(a)(1) (2007). 
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4) & (5); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.306, .320 & .321(2007); 
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.322 to .324 (2006). 
40. Id. 
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320. 
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4) (2004); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324. 
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(5), (c)(2), (e) (2004); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (2007); 
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507 & .508 (2006). 
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R § 300.510 (2007). 
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g), (i)(1)(B), (i)(2); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.514 & .516 
(2006). 
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (2004) (emphasis added); see also 
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). In 2007, the 
Supreme Court found that the IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable 
rights. Id. at 533. It reasoned that the grammatical structure of the IDEA's 
purpose . . . would make no sense unless ―rights‖ refers to the parents' rights 
as well as the child's. Id. at 528. 
9
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parent‘s prior written consent.47 A child cannot be evaluated or 
receive special education services without the parent‘s 
permission.48 If a parent fails to respond or refuses to consent 
to an initial evaluation, the school district may, but is not 
required to, initiate due process procedures to have the child 
evaluated without parental consent.49 Even if a school district 
is able to circumvent the parent‘s consent and the child is 
evaluated, parental consent is again required to initiate special 
education services.50 At this time, if the parent refuses to 
consent or fails to respond to a request to provide consent to 
the provision of special education programs and services, the 
school district shall not provide the special education program 
and services and cannot use the due process procedures.51 
Therefore, a parent has substantial decision-making authority 
at the initial referral stage. If a parent does not want the child 
to receive special education and related services, the parent‘s 
decision is final. 
Once a child with a disability is determined eligible for 
special education services, ―parents work collaboratively with 
teachers, representatives of the LEA [local education agency], 
psychologists and other education professionals to develop[,]‖ 
review, and revise an IEP for the student.52 As members of the 
IEP Team,53 parents are equal participants in deciding their 
child‘s IEP.54 They provide critical information, participate in 
discussions about the child‘s need for special education and 
related services and join in deciding the child‘s IEP.55 
 
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D). 
48. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I), (II). 
49. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I); 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(3)(i) (2008). 
50. IDEA further cautions that parental consent for initial evaluation 
must not be construed as consent for initial provision of special education and 
related services. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I); 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(1)(ii). 
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(II); 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(3). 
52. Margaret M. Wakelin, Challenging Disparities in Special Education: 
Moving Parents from Disempowered Team Members to Ardent Advocates, 3 
NW. J. L. SOC. POL‘Y 263 (2008). 
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i). 
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Various procedural safeguards in § 1415 of the IDEA 
protect a parent‘s status as an equal participant.56 First, school 
districts must provide notice and ensure that one or both 
parents are present, or are afforded the opportunity to 
participate, at each meeting related to the evaluation, 
identification, and educational placement of the child.57 Second, 
the IDEA provides parents with the opportunity for mediation 
and to present a complaint ―with respect to any [disagreement] 
relating to the identification, evaluation or educational 
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate 
public education.‖58 If a resolution is not reached, the parents 
have the opportunity for an impartial due process hearing.59 
And, if the parents disagree with the hearing officer‘s findings 
of fact and decision, they have the right to appeal and 
thereafter sue.60 The IDEA, therefore, provides extensive 
measures that protect a parent as the child‘s educational 
representative. 
 Based on this discussion, it is beyond dispute that 
parents possess a fundamental right to decide their child‘s 
upbringing and education. This right gives parents the 
authority to determine whether their child receives special 
education services and allows parents to participate in the 
special education process. Therefore, the dynamics of special 
education representation must incorporate a parent‘s right to 
decide their child‘s education. 
 
IV. Representing Children 
 
More than a decade ago, a group of children‘s advocates, 
legal ethicists, and other academics convened for the Fordham 
Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of 
Children (Conference).61 Focusing on child welfare cases, the 
 
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2004). 
57. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b)(1) & (e), 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.322(a)(1), 
.501(a) & (b)(1)(i) (2006). 
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(5)-(6). 
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). 
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g), (i). 
61. Bruce A. Green & Bernandine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the 
11
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Conference forged a consensus that ―a lawyer appointed or 
retained to serve a child in a legal proceeding should serve as 
the child‘s lawyer.‖62 In such cases, the court questions the 
parent‘s ability to act in the best interests of the child, and 
therefore, the role of counsel is to protect and represent the 
rights and interests of the child in controversy.63 Special 
education representation, however, is not wholly different from 
these other areas of the law where children require legal 
representation. 
In child welfare cases, the normal presumption that the 
parent acts in the best interests of the child does not apply.64 
While the parent has the right to decide the upbringing of the 
child, the Supreme Court cautions that parental autonomy is 
not absolute.65 Under the doctrine of parens patriae, ―the state 
has the right, indeed a duty, to protect children.‖66 Thus, in 
some areas of decision-making, the interests of the child 
overcome the presumption that parents will make the best 
decision. For example, the state as the guardian of society‘s 
basic values may interfere to safeguard the child‘s health,67 
 
Ethical Practice of Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1284-86 (1996). 
62. Fordham Conference, supra note 2, at 1301. 
63. Robyn-Marie Lyon, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent 
Counsel for Minors, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 681, 694 (1987). The lawyer is ―bound 
by, and [must] speak for . . . [the child]-client.‖ Id. 
64. Id. (presumption in favor of parental decision-making is rebuttable). 
65. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (decision to institutionalize 
is largely up to the parent); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) 
(invalidating a Massachusetts law requiring parental consent for abortions 
by unmarried minors); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring 
fundamentally fair procedures when the State moves to destroy weakened 
familial bonds by terminating parental rights). 
66. See generally Lyon, supra note 63. 
67. See Matter of Eli H., 22 Misc.3d 965, 970 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2008) 
(―Every parent has the fundamental right to raise his/her child, that right, 
however, is ‗not absolute inasmuch as the State, as parens patriae, may 
intervene to ensure that a child‘s health or welfare is not being seriously 
jeopardized by a parent's fault or omission.‘‖); see also Matter of Shawndel 
M., 33 A.D.3d 1006 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (mother neglected her child, a 
diagnosed diabetic, by failing to provide her with adequate medical care); 
Matter of Miller v. Orbaker, 17 A.D.3d 1145 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) 
(transferring custody to nonparent where parent indicated she would 
discontinue child's medication contrary to medical advice). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/11
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educational development,68 and emotional well-being.69 Even in 
cases where the parent is fit to make decisions on the child‘s 
behalf, a parent could still misrepresent, intentionally or 
unintentionally, the child‘s interests. ―[I]nformation about 
children and their desires communicated to lawyers through 
parents undergoes two levels of emotional intellectual 
distortion. Children may be unable or unwilling to give their 
parents all the facts; parents may not fully relay information to 
the lawyers.‖70 Therefore, ―whatever right parents may have to 
serve as the sole legal spokesperson for their children [even in 
special education proceedings] cannot be based entirely on 
their ability to represent accurately their children‘s intentions 
and desires.‖71 
Many jurisdictions already provide by statute for 
appointment of a child representative in child welfare cases 
and custody proceedings at the discretion of the judge.72 The 
purpose of these statutes is to address the potentially adverse 
effects of divorce on the child and focus on the interests of the 
child.73 Lawyers for children in custody proceedings find that 
―because of their position in the case, they often could uncover 
 
68. See, e.g., Matter of William AA., 24 A.D.3d 1125 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005) (mother removed the child from public school because she disagreed 
with recommendation for a small classroom setting and did not enroll him in 
another school). 
69. See, e.g., Matter of LeVonn G., 20 A.D.3d 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) 
(child's emotional condition was impaired or placed in imminent danger of 
impairment by the mother's unwillingness to pursue a recommended course 
of psychiatric treatment for him); Matter of Jonathan C., 195 A.D.2d 554 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (the child‘s physical condition was impaired by 
unreasonable infliction of excessive corporal punishment and emotional 
condition was impaired or placed in imminent danger of impairment by 
mother's failure to cooperate with recommendations of his therapist); Matter 
of Junaro C., 145 A.D.2d 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (mother failed to supply 
her child with adequate psychiatric medical care which placed her child in 
imminent danger of having his mental and emotional condition impaired). 
70. David H. Neely, Handicapped Advocacy: Inherent Barriers and 
Partial Solutions in the Representation of Disabled Children, 33 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1359, 1363 (1962). 
71. Id. at 1363-64. 
72. Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in 
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different kinds of information and promote a constructive 
approach to resolve the dispute.‖74 ―Rather than increasing the 
scope and intensity of the controversy, many attorneys for 
children acted to mediate conflict and settle the dispute out of 
court.‖75 Mediation by a lawyer in the special education context 
could very well lead to similar results, if the child is the 
client.76 
Advocates and lawyers remark that ―special education 
cases can generate as much emotional intensity as a bitterly 
contested divorce.‖77 Lawyers representing a parent in a 
custody dispute often encounter situations in which the 
interests or desires of the client are at odds with the best 
interests of the child.78 Similar circumstances can occur in a 
special education case. While the parents exceed minimum 
standards of parental fitness, they are caught up in the 
emotional dynamics of the dispute. They ―experience anger 
toward the school officials, each other and even the child.‖79 
―They feel guilty, confused, frustrated, helpless, fearful, and 
 
74. Lawyering for the Child, supra note 72, at 1172-73. 
75. Id. Moreover, ―[t]he possibility of talking to all parties directly gives 
the child's attorney unique advantages in obtaining information about the 
parents and the child, since this information would rarely, if ever, be 
available to a parent's attorney.‖ Id. at 1173. 
76. See generally Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven S. Goldberg, Is Mediation a 
Fair Way to Resolve Special Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 35 (1997). 
77. Peter W. D. Wright, Representing the Special Education Child: A 
Manual for the Attorney and Lay Advocate (Jan. 21, 2009), 
http://www.wrightslaw.com/advoc/articles/attorney_manual.html. 
78. See generally Lawyering for the Child, supra note 72. 
Accusations of blame and unfitness are common since 
parents often use custody proceedings to vent bitter feelings 
or to gain leverage in the financial settlement. The result is 
a contentious, destructive, and often prolonged dispute that 
may seriously threaten the possibility of a workable 
arrangement for visitation between the child and the parent 
who ultimately is denied custody. Here the child's interests 
in the process and in the outcome of the proceeding are 
closely connected: children generally benefit from amicable 
contact with the noncustodial parent and suffer without it. 
Id. at 1131-32. 
79. Wright, supra note 77. 
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remorseful.‖80 In both types of proceedings, the interests of the 
child are at the center of the dispute and it is often the child 
who suffers. Special education lawyers, therefore, suggest that 
a lawyer approach a special education case as one would 
approach a messy custody or divorce proceeding.81 And, since 
lawyers in such proceedings represent the child, a lawyer in a 
special education proceeding, should also represent the child. 
When the child is the client, a lawyer is in a better position to 
mediate the conflict between the parents and the school 
district. The child is also given a voice in the proceedings. 
Children in both child welfare proceedings and special 
education proceedings are in an incredibly disempowered 
state.82 In abuse and neglect proceedings: 
 
They have been violated and hurt by the people 
who are supposed to love and protect them. They 
have had their private lives and stories 
publicized and repeated by those who promised 
to keep it secret. They have been moved from 
person to person and from place to place and now 
find themselves in a courthouse with no clear 
reason as to why or what may occur. These 
children need someone to ensure that their voices 
are heard both inside and outside of the 
courtroom.83 
 
Similarly, children with learning difficulties and behavior 
problems are academically, emotionally, and mentally scarred. 
They have poor self-concepts relating to their school 




82. See Randi Mandelbaum, Rules of Confidentiality When Representing 
Children: The Need for a “Bright Line” Test, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2053 (1996). 
83. Id. at 2058. 
84. See Jean Cheng Gorman, Understanding Children’s Hearts and 
Minds: Emotional Functioning and Learning Disabilities (Jan.-Feb. 1999), 
available at http://www.ldonline.org/article/Understanding_Children's_ 
Hearts_and_ Minds:_Emotional_Functioning_and_Learning_Disabilities. 
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physical assault, removal of possessions).85 These students also 
need to express their thoughts and concerns and experience 
success in school.86 
Movements for the representation of children in legal 
proceedings have been met with some opposition. Some 
commentators argue that a lawyer-client relationship with the 
child casts the parent as the enemy.87 Others argue that the 
role of the lawyer is not to decide the best interests of the child. 
Courts and commentators, however, ―have often and 
overwhelmingly rejected the idea that a lawyer should act in 
what the lawyer determines is the client‘s ‗best interests.‘‖88 
Indeed, the most obvious role of the parent throughout the 
course of representation is to decide what is in the best 
interests of the child-client. This Comment does not seek to 
supersede the parent‘s role as decision maker. Rather, the 
main purpose of this Comment is to provide a role for the 
parent and the child in the representation. As such, the parent 
should remain an integral part of the representation. 
 
V. Understanding and Applying Model Rule 1.14 
 
A. The Child as the Client and the Role of the Parent 
 
Model Rule 1.14 and this Comment recognize the child as 
the client.89 Therefore, when a lawyer-client relationship with 
 
85. Id. 
86. ―50% of children under age fifteen who committed suicide in Los 
Angeles County over a three-year period had been diagnosed as learning 
disabled.‖ Id. 
87. Martin Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 
NEV. L. J. 805, 829 (2006) (―The defining characteristic of the child protection 
movement is its anti-parent stance.‖). 
88. Daniel L. Bray & Michael D. Ensley, Dealing with the Mentally 
Incapacitated Client: The Ethical Issues Facing the Attorney, 33 FAM. L.Q. 
329, 340 (1999). 
89. A lawyer-client relationship with the child furthers the purpose and 
intent behind Model Rule 1.14. The rule purposely includes a flexible 
standard that formulates a lawyer‘s responsibility to maintain a normal 
lawyer-client relationship with a client with diminished capacity in terms of 
―as far as reasonably possible.‖ Elizabeth Laffitte, Model Rule 1.14: The Well-
Intended Rule Still Leaves Some Questions Unanswered, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/11
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the child is reasonably possible, a lawyer should mediate the 
conflict between the parent and school district while advocating 
the child‘s wishes.90 And, even when a normal lawyer-client 
relationship is not fully possible, the child should remain an 
active participant in the representation. ―[C]hildren as young 
as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, 
are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in 
legal proceedings concerning their custody.‖91 The same can be 
said of a child‘s ability to offer opinions concerning their 
education. A child ―often has the ability to understand, 
deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting 
the [child‘s] own well-being.‖92 While a lawyer is ultimately 
guided by the child‘s wishes, a lawyer may also consult with 
the child‘s parent.93 Only where the parent‘s decision is clearly 
adverse to the interests of the client will a lawyer consider 
other options in protecting the interests of the client and 
putting the client‘s interests first.94 
Although a normal lawyer-client relationship with a child 
will not be possible in all instances, the Model Rules never 
suggest viewing the parent as the client. Rather, the Rules 
advise a lawyer to look to the parents as the natural guardian 
in certain types of proceedings in which a lawyer is 
representing a minor.95 Comment 3 of Model Rule 1.14 reminds 
a lawyer that the utmost duty remains with the individual 
 
ETHICS 313, 319 (2004) (citing A.B.A. CENTER FOR PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY, A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982 – 1998 at 125 (1999)). Such a standard is 
necessary in special education representation. The flexible nature of the rule 
allows a lawyer to take into consideration the child‘s wishes, values, and 
goals, where the client is not fully capable of making decisions about 
important matters. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt 1 
(2009). If a normal lawyer-client relationship is not possible when a client is 
very young, the lawyer still has the opportunity to develop such a 
relationship as the child grows and matures. 
90. See id. R. 1.2(a) (2009). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2009). 
93. Id. R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (2009). 
94. Id. R. 1.14(b) (2009). 
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (2009). 
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client.96 ―[A] lawyer must keep the client‘s interests foremost 
and, except for protective action . . . must look to the client, and 
not family members to make decisions on the client‘s behalf.‖97 
Accordingly, a lawyer‘s ethical responsibilities protect the 
child-client, not the parent. 
While the parent is not the client, the parent does play a 
major role in the representation and maintains substantial 
authority in making decisions on behalf of the child. A lawyer 
can and should look to the parent to direct the course of 
representation on behalf of the child, especially when a lawyer-
client relationship with the child is not possible. And, in 
accordance with parental rights, the IDEA, and the Model 
Rules, the parent possesses significant authority to decide the 
child‘s education. In cases where the parent‘s decision appears 
detrimental to the child‘s education or the parent‘s decision 
conflicts with the client‘s wishes, however, the parent‘s decision 
is not determinative.98 Since the child is the client, a lawyer‘s 
ethical responsibilities remain with the child, not the parent. 
The purpose is not to remove the parent from the 
representation. Rather, everyone is involved in the 
representation if the child is the client. 
 
 1. Confidentiality of Information 
 
Confidentiality presents a difficult situation for a lawyer 
whether the parent is the client or the child is the client. Model 
Rule 1.6 prohibits a lawyer from revealing information related 
to the representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent or the disclosure is impliedly authorized in 
order to carry out the representation.99 Absent one of the 
exceptions, the Rule prohibits a lawyer from sharing 
information with the non-client. Deciding to represent the child 
as the client, however, furthers the purpose behind the 
 
96. Id. R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (2009). 
97. Id. (emphasis added). 
98. See id. R. 1.14(b) (2009); see also id. R. 1.6 (2009). 
99. Id. R. 1.6(a) (2009). Model Rule 1.6 is mandatory; a violation of a 
lawyer‘s ethical obligation to keep client confidences could result in 
discipline. See id., Scope (2009). 
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confidentiality rules. It protects the child‘s involvement in the 
representation and provides the lawyer with comprehensive 
information in order to be effective.100 
The confidentiality of a client‘s statements to a lawyer is at 
the core of the lawyer-client relationship, and therefore, at the 
center of an effective advocacy system.101 The purpose and 
intent behind the confidentiality rules, however, are clearly 
frustrated when the parent is the client. While communication 
with the parent-client is fully protected, any and all 
communication with the child is subject to disclosure. Where 
the parent permits the lawyer to meet privately with the child, 
the lawyer must inform the child that anything said during the 
meeting must be revealed to the parents upon request.102 
Alternatively, the parent-client may insist on being present 
during the meeting. In either situation, the lawyer is ―unable to 
communicate fully and frankly with the child.‖103 Rather, there 
is a strong ―belief that [the child] will be less than forthcoming 
with the truth if not given protection from disclosure of 
 
100. See Mandelbaum, supra note 82. ―The need for confidentiality has 
been argued through a three-step syllogism. First . . . lawyers must be able to 
represent their clients effectively. . . . Second, lawyers need full information 
in order to be effective. Third, clients may not fully disclose all of the 
information in their possession unless confidentiality is guaranteed.‖ Id. at 
2057. 
101. Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2009). 
―A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the 
absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal 
information relating to the representation. . . . This contributes to the trust 
that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.‖ Id. 
102. See generally id. R. 1.4 (2009); see also Gerald F. Glynn, 
Multidisciplinary Representation of Children: Conflicts over Disclosures of 
Client Communications, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617, 646 – 47 (1994). 
[I]t is often professionally and legally advantageous to have 
some private communications with the child client. 
Professionals will want to have communications with the 
child-client without the parents present to evaluate the 
child‘s behavior outside the presence of the parent and to 
challenge the perceptions provided by the parent. Legally, 
the parents‘ presence could destroy any confidentiality or 
privilege. Courts treat parents like any other third party 
present during a conversation. 
Id. 
103. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2009). 
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professional-client communications.‖104 
As the client, the parent also decides whether to involve 
the child in the representation. A lawyer could be forced to 
represent the child‘s interest without ever laying eyes of the 
child. In that case, the lawyer‘s ability to effectively represent 
the needs of the child is severely limited. The lawyer is unable 
to recognize, facilitate and maximize the child‘s capabilities 
because the lawyer has no authority or ethical obligation to see 
the child or meet with the child. 
A lawyer is more effective in advocating the interests of the 
child when the child is the client. A lawyer-client relationship 
with the child allows the lawyer an opportunity to meet the 
child, and under the protection of the confidentiality rules, the 
child is more likely ―to communicate fully and frankly with the 
lawyer.‖105 Even if the child is not capable of actively 
participating in the representation, the lawyer gains a wealth 
of information simply by observing the child for a moment.106 
A lawyer-client relationship with the child also empowers 
the child. Children having difficulty in school are in a 
disempowered state.107 They have likely been the target of a 
―steady diet of insults and embarrassment.‖108 And, prior to the 
representation, the child probably has had little opportunity to 
be heard.109 As the client, the child makes decisions about the 
case ―in an informed and fully participatory manner.‖110 The 
decision could be as simple as deciding to meet privately with 
the lawyer or having the parents present during the meeting. 
 
104. Glynn, supra note 102, at 626. 
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2009). 
106. Every child should be seen except in those rare instances where it is 
physically impossible for the lawyer to see the child. The lawyer should 
always ―lay eyes‖ on the client. See Fordham Conference, supra note 2, at 
1312. 
107. See Mandelbaum, supra note 82, at 2058. 
108. R. Cary Westbrook, The Journey Begins, excerpt from Learning 
Disabilities and College: Strategies for People that Rock Our World, 
http://www.ldonline.org/firstperson/7005. 
109. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2004). 
110. Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking 
the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1690 (1996). 
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The decision, however, is left to the child-client, not the lawyer 
or the parents.111 
While legal representation of a child is most effective when 
a child‘s statements are protected under the confidentiality 
rules, strict adherence to the Rules is not possible in all 
cases.112 A lawyer‘s ethical obligation to preserve child‘s 
confidences requires a determination of the child‘s capacity and 
judgment to participate effectively in matters and decisions 
affecting the child‘s life through his or her legal 
representation.113 When a normal lawyer-client relationship 
with a child is reasonably possible, the representation can be 
carried out while fully complying with Model Rule 1.6.114 Even 
when a child‘s capacity to participate in the representation is 
limited, a lawyer should attempt to keep the client‘s confidence 
whenever possible.115 ―Nevertheless, to expect [lawyers] to keep 
a child‘s confidences at all times and to hold [lawyers] to this 
 
111. Pursuant to Model Rule 1.2 and its commentary, the client decides 
the objectives of the representation and the lawyer acts as ―impliedly 
authorized to carry out the representation‖ of the child-client. MODEL RULES 
OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009); see also id. R. 1.4 (2009); Elizabeth 
Caufman & Larence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on 
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1778 (1995) (―[A] central 
developmental task of early adolescence is the establishment of an 
‗individuated‘ sense of self – a self that is not completely bound in the child‘s 
bond with his or her parents, but that has nevertheless internalized their 
values and standards.‖); Laura Cohen & Randi Mandelbaum, Kids Will Be 
Kids: Creating a Framework for Interviewing and Counseling Adolescent 
Clients, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 357 (2006). ―While peer pressure has been identified 
as a significant force, so too is the influence of parents, especially on matters 
of a serious or long-term nature.‖ Id. at 394-95. 
112. The working group on confidentiality at the Conference on Ethical 
Issues in the Legal Representation of Children recognized that ―a rigorous 
application of [Model Rule 1.6] . . . may do more harm to the relationship 
between attorney and client and in the end may be contrary to the effective 
representation of the child.‖ Mandelbaum, supra note 82, at 2055. Without a 
clear test to determine when the rule should apply, Randi Mandelbaum, a 
participant of the working group on confidentiality, found that lawyers must 
determine the child‘s capacity ―before determining what confidentiality 
obligations are due to the child.‖ Id. at 2056. This Comment agrees with 
those findings and applies some of the rationale to special education 
proceedings. 
113. Id. at 2056. 
114. Id. at 2062. 
115. Id. 
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standard as a rule is impossible and unfair to both the child 
client and the lawyer.‖116 In cases where the child is unable to 
participate or to understand fully the concept of confidentiality, 
a lawyer should turn to the parents to determine the child‘s 
best interest.117 In accordance with Model Rule 1.14, the lawyer 
looks to the parents while keeping the child-client‘s interest 
foremost.118 
While adhering to the rule of confidentiality with a child 
may be challenging at times, a lawyer-client relationship with 
the child offers the most effective representation. Regardless of 
the child‘s capacity, a lawyer-client relationship ensures the 
child‘s active participation in the case and provides the lawyer 
with the full information. When the child is competent, the 
lawyer treats the child-client as the lawyer would an adult and 
advises the child fully and candidly about the case.119 Even 
when a child‘s capacity to participate in the representation is 
limited, the obligation of confidentiality is so fundamental to 
the lawyer-client relationship that it is critical for lawyers 
representing impaired children to attempt to keep their clients‘ 
confidences whenever possible.120 
 
 2. Conflicts of Interest 
 
In most cases, the parent‘s decision regarding the child‘s 
education will align with the child‘s wishes and a lawyer can 
advocate accordingly. In some cases, however, the parents and 
the child will disagree. There is also concern that a parent‘s 
interest will interfere with a lawyer‘s representation of the 
child.121 Ordinarily, when a conflict arises a lawyer must 
 
116. Id. 
117. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R.1.14 cmt. 4 (2009). 
118. Id. R. 1.14(b), (c) (2009). When taking protective action for a child 
unable to act in her own interests, the lawyer is impliedly authorized to 
reveal information about the client. Id. 
119. Federle, supra note 110, at 1691. 
120. Mandelbaum, supra note 82, at 2062. For purposes of this article, 
an impaired child includes ―a baby, a nonverbal child, and a child with severe 
intellectual or emotional deficits or both.‖ Id. at 2054. 
121. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009). ―Concurrent 
conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
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2011] ETHICS AND SPECIAL EDUCATION LAWYERS 553 
 
withdraw from the representation unless the lawyer obtains 
the informed consent of the client and the third party. 
Conflicts, however, cannot always be waived by consent and, in 
matters involving children, obtaining an effective consent from 
the child can be a problem.122 To avoid such conflicts, the Model 
Rules ―encourage lawyers to presume there is or at some point 
will be a conflict between the parties.‖123 The purpose of a 
conflicts analysis is to provide the most effective representation 
by discussing certain conflicts and using that knowledge to 
determine which lawyer-client relationship offers the best 
position for all the parties involved. 
One of the major concerns in a conflicts analysis is that 
both the parent and the child possess ―independent, 
enforceable rights.‖124 Under the IDEA, when a dispute arises 
with the school officials, both the parents and the child have a 
right to contest any aspect of a proposed program of special 
education.125 In other words, a lawyer can represent the parent, 
the child, or both.126 Deciding to represent both parent and 
child, however, can present a conflict and does little to clarify 
the course of the representation. Indeed, a lawyer must 
consider the desires and expectations of all the interested 
 
client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's own interests.‖ 
Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2009). See also Neely, supra note 70, at 1395. The opposite 
could also occur where a mature child feels that they need to go to a 
residential school and the parent wants the child to stay at home. 
Furthermore, a parent may try to hinder a child‘s future by placing the child 
in a position of dependency rather than independence. See also Glynn, supra 
note 102. ―There are many instances where the parents‘ desired outcome may 
differ from those by the child.‖ Id. at 626. In the most extreme cases, a parent 
may seek to commit the child to a mental health facility or send the child 
away to a residential school while the child wishes to stay at home with 
family and friends. Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the 
Representation of Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1819, 1845 (1996). 
122. See Moore, supra note 121, at 1820. 
123. Guggenheim, supra note 87, at 829. Otherwise, ―[i]f a conflict arises 
after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must 
withdraw from the representation.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7 
cmt. 4 (2009). 
124. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (finding 
that the IDEA grants parents ―independent, enforceable rights‖). 
125. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (2004). 
126. Moore, supra note 121, at 1825 n.31. 
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parties (including the lawyer).127 A lawyer must also decide 
who directs the representation and ―what to do if the clients 
disagree during the course of the representation . . . .‖128 
While a lawyer should refrain from representing both the 
parent and child, conflicts may still arise. If the course of the 
representation is not clearly defined, the parent may assume 
the role of the client. Generally, the parent retains a lawyer 
regarding a dispute with the local school district over the 
child‘s interests. ―[T]he parent [is] fully expecting not only to 
select and compensate the lawyer, but also to play a significant 
role in directing the course of the representation.‖129 The 
lawyer, however, may consider the child to be the client. In this 
case, a lawyer could be forced to withdraw from the 
representation.130 
While some commentators suggest that ―[i]f the lawyer 
represents the parent alone, then standard conflicts analysis 
simply does not apply, regardless of any disagreements or other 
conflict of interests between parent and child,‖ such a 
conclusion does more harm than good in special education 
proceedings.131 If a conflict arises between the parent and the 
child, a lawyer for the parent is required to represent the 
parent‘s decision—no matter what. Therefore, it is true that if 
the parent is the client, no conflict would arise. However, this 
is not because the parent and child agree, but because the 
lawyer‘s ethical responsibility forces the lawyer to avoid the 
child‘s wishes, values, and goals all together. This is not the 
type of representation that should occur in special education 
cases where the child is a party whose interest requires 
protection and advocacy. 
Deciding to represent the child does not cure the 
representation of a potential conflict.132 Given the nature and 
 
127. Id. at 1824-25. 
128. Id. at 1824. 
129. Id. 
130. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 4 (2009). 
131. Moore, supra note 121, at 1824. 
132. Id. at 1844-54. When the child is the client, the parent assumes the 
role of an interested third person; ―that is, a person who typically not only 
hires and pays for the lawyer to represent the child, but also expects to be an 
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extent of special education representation, however, a lawyer-
client relationship with the child is the best alternative for 
dealing with potential conflicts. If a conflict arises, the child‘s 
interests are protected, not ignored. Moreover, a lawyer-client 
relationship with the child allows the lawyer to use the ethical 
standards of the legal profession to ―reduce the uncertainty and 
conflict inherent in [the] representation by [allowing] the 
lawyer [to] communicate with the child, caretakers and outside 
consultants, mediate client conflicts and negotiate with adverse 
interests.‖133 If resolution of a conflict is not possible, it is the 
parent and not the child that is capable of obtaining 
independent representation to settle the dispute. 
 
 3. Terminating the Representation 
 
One of the purposes behind Model Rule 1.14 was to 
―formulate an intermediate position‖ between refusing to 
represent a client with diminished capacity, withdrawing from 
the case, and seeking the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem.134 
 
In the absence of Rule 1.14, a lawyer whose 
client becomes incompetent would have no choice 
but to withdraw, not only because a lawyer who 
continues the representation would be acting 
without authority, but also because the lawyer 
would be unable to carry out his responsibilities 
to the client under the Rules . . . .135 
 
 
active participant and decision-maker in the course of the representation.‖ Id. 
at 1844. 
133. See generally Neely, supra note 70, at 1405. 
134. Elizabeth Laffitte, Model Rule 1.14: The Well-Intended Rule Still 
Leaves Some Questions Unanswered, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 313 n.3 
(2003) (referencing Email from Geoffrey Hazard, Law Professor and 
Promulgator of Model Rule 1.14, University of Pennsylvania, to Elizabeth 
Laffitte (Feb. 24, 2003) (on file with author)). 
135. Id. at 313 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 96-404 (1996)). 
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If the parent is the client, however, the lawyer is unable to act 
as an intermediary. The lawyer‘s only option is to withdraw 
from the representation if a conflict arises. 
The Model Rules permit a lawyer to ―withdraw from 
representing a client [when] . . . the client insists upon taking 
action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the 
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.‖136 However, a 
decision to withdraw from the representation leaves the child, 
the party of interest, without legal assistance and protection. 
Furthermore, the lawyer‘s duty to preserve forever the 
confidences and secrets of the parent-client, unless waived, 
precludes the lawyer from notifying the proper authorities or 
requesting a guardian ad litem to protect the interests of the 
child.137 Since the child is the party of interest in special 
education law, it would be difficult, if not almost impossible, to 
require a lawyer to ignore entirely the interests of the child. 
With the child as the client, however, a lawyer has several 
options in protecting the child‘s interests as well as her own. 
Model Rule 1.14 and its commentary are clear that a lawyer is 
not to decide the best interests of the child.138 Instead a lawyer 
is to advocate the child‘s decisions or the decisions made by the 
parent on behalf of the child. However, ―[w]hen [a] lawyer 
reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is 
at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless 
action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client‘s own 
interest, [a] lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective 
action, including consulting with individuals or entities that 
have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in 
appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad 
 
136. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2009). 
137. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 2 (2010); see also id. 
R. 1.6(b) (2010). 
138. The comment to the Rule offers several factors that should guide 
the lawyer‘s decision to take protective action, including ―the wishes and 
values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the 
goals of intruding into the client's decision-making autonomy to the least 
extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's 
family and social connections.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 
5 (2009). 
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litem, conservator or guardian.‖139 Thus, when a lawyer who 
reasonably believes that the parent‘s decisions place the child 
in substantial harm, the lawyer may take protective action. 
A decision to take protective action, however, should not be 
taken lightly. Two useful measures to consider beforehand 
include using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or 
improvement of circumstances or consulting with support 
groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other 
individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the 
client.140 Under Model Rule 1.14(c), a lawyer is impliedly 
authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the 
client when taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), 
but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the 
client‘s interests.141 After consulting with other services, 
agencies, and professionals, a lawyer may be better equipped to 
evaluate, counsel, negotiate, and advocate for the child‘s needs. 
A lawyer may also be able to use such information to 
coordinate efforts with the parents. 
If these intermediate measures fail, a lawyer is not forced 
to abide by the parent‘s decision. In cases where a lawyer feels 
compelled to seek further protection, a lawyer may seek the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem to protect the interests of 
the child. Within the language of the IDEA, ―if a judicial decree 
or order identifies a specific person or persons . . . to act as the 
‗parent‘ of a child or to make educational decisions on behalf of 
a child, then such person or persons shall be determined to be 
the ‗parent‘ for purposes of this section.‖142 Thus, an 
educational guardian appointed by the court as a parent 
preempts any other possible ―IDEA Parent,‖ including the birth 
or adoptive parent, from making educational decisions.143 The 
Model Rules prefer that a lawyer advocate the least restrictive 
action on behalf of the client; however, the Rules entrust the 
 
139. Id. R. 1.14(b) (2009). 
140. Id. R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (2009). 
141. Id. R. 1.14(c) (2009). 
142. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23) (2004); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(2) (2006). 
143. Janet Scotland et al., Special Education Decisions for Children in 
Foster Care: Everyone Has a Role, 26 A.B.A. CHILD LAW PRACTICE, No. 2, 2007 
at 22. 
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evaluation of the circumstances to the professional judgment of 
the lawyer.144 
 
B. A Clear and Defined Course of Representation 
 
A decision to treat the child as the client must be conveyed 
to the parents before the start of the representation. Unless a 
lawyer clearly states that she is not representing the parent or 
also representing the parent, ―the parent‘s reasonable 
expectations and reliance may form the basis of any attorney-
client relationship despite the intent of the lawyer.‖145 
Therefore, a lawyer must determine at the outset the identity 
of the client, the lawyer‘s role, and the identity of the decision 
maker, and relay those decisions to the parents in a detailed 
retainer agreement.146 
The retainer agreement should clearly state that the child 
is the client.147 To avoid a conflict of interest between the 
interested parties, the retainer agreement should also outline 
the lawyer‘s role as an advocate for the child and the duties 
involved in that role.148 Most importantly, the retainer should 
describe the allocation of decision-making.149 Since the child‘s 
statements, and not the parents, are protected under the 
confidential rules, the retainer agreement should also explain 
in detail, but also in a manner understandable to all the 
parties, whether and to what extent the child‘s communications 
will be kept in confidence.150 If the parents do not agree to 
these terms, a lawyer should decline the representation.151 
 
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 7 (2009). 
145. Kim Brooks Tandy & Teresa Heffernan, Representing Children with 
Disabilities: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 6 NEV. L.J. 1396, 1402 (2006); 
see also Moore, supra note 121. 
146. When a lawyer is retained, the lawyer should seek to resolve 
uncertainties at the time of the lawyer‘s retention. See Fordham Conference, 
supra note 2, at 1308 (1996). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. See also Wright, supra note 77. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. ―A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it 
can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest 
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The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility alone do 
not provide clear guidance for the role of the special education 
lawyer. Rather, the role of counsel derives from interplay of the 
federal and state rules, rights, and laws governing special 
education. Abiding by the lawyer‘s ethical mandate to recognize 
the child as the client and incorporating the parent‘s right to 
decide the child‘s education offers the best course of 
representation. It is the most effective way of abiding by the 
state Rules of Professional Conduct, upholding parental rights, 
and keeping the interests of the child foremost. This Comment, 
however, presents only the initial discussion of a lawyer-client 
relationship with the child in special education cases. 
Additional recommendations and practice standards are still 




and to completion. Ordinarily, a representation in a matter is completed 
when the agreed-upon assistance has been concluded.‖ MODEL RULES OF 
PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 1 (2009). See also id. RR. 1.2(c), 1.3 cmt. 4, 6.5 
(2009). 
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